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Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer
STEPHEN B. COHEN*
The title-which may surprise readers-is not an oxymoron. During his
twenty-four years on the Supreme Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote
better opinions on the law of federal income taxation than any of his fellow
Justices. This is, of course, a subjective appraisal which others may dispute.
Nevertheless, from two decades of teaching federal income taxation, I am
convinced of the quality of Marshall's work.
However his work is rated, Marshall's impact on federal income tax law
seems indisputable. One indicator is that leading casebooks in the field often
include more opinions by him than by any other Supreme Court Justice, past
or present, with the exception of Justice Harry Blackmun.' Even the sea-
soned tax specialist may be surprised and impressed by the complete list of
Marshall's Supreme Court tax opinions, which include such landmark cases
as United States v. Davis, 2 United States v. American Bar Endowment, 3 Ar-
kansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner,4 Hernandez v. Commissioner,5 and Cot-
tage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner.6
This essay discusses Marshall's contributions to the law of federal income
taxation in four important areas: form and substance, capital gains, realiza-
tion, and charitable contributions. 7
I. FORM AND SUBSTANCE
The issue of form and substance pervades the law of federal income taxa-
tion. 8 "The extent to which taxpayers are free to minimize their tax obliga-
tions by choosing one legal form rather than another," notes one
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am deeply indebted, for reading and
commenting on an earlier draft, to Sue Bloch, Marvin Chirelstein, Marty Ginsberg, Steve Goldberg,
Mike Graetz, Dan Halperin, Bill Klein, Tom Krattenmaker, Janet Milne, Mike Seidman, Mark
Tushnet, and Bernie Wolfman.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (4th ed. 1991); JAMES J.
FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1988).
2. 397 U.S. 301 (1969).
3. 477 U.S. 105 (1968).
4. 485 U.S. 212 (1987).
5. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
7. Each of the four subjects raises enough hard issues to deserve a separate, lengthy article. It is
hard to do justice to any of the subjects in a short essay of this nature. Thus, the discussion of each
will of necessity be somewhat selective and cursory.
8. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ES-
TATES AND GIFTS 4.3.3 (2d ed. 1989) (survey of numerous areas of federal tax law affected by
form versus substance issue).
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commentator, "has preoccupied lawyers and administrators since the incep-
tion of the federal income tax." 9 Sometimes, courts permit the taxpayer's
chosen form to control tax results and refuse to permit the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to recast the transaction based on its substance.10 At other
times, courts do not allow the taxpayer's form to control and allow the IRS
to recast the transaction as involving a different form."
Skepticism marked Marshall's work in this area. He questioned the con-
ventional wisdom that the taxpayer's motive or purpose was relevant to de-
ciding whether the IRS was entitled to disregard the taxpayer's form.
Moreover, he doubted that any general, overarching rule could be devised to
determine when the taxpayer's form should be respected and when it could
be recast.
Marshall's views on form and substance can be usefully contrasted with
the test endorsed by an earlier Supreme Court opinion in Gregory v. Helver-
ing.12 Gregory formulated what has become a general rule on form and sub-
stance' 3 and made the focus of its rule the taxpayer's motive or purpose.
According to Gregory, the critical factor for determining whether the tax-
payer's form controls is whether the taxpayer had a business purpose, other
than avoiding taxes, for choosing that form.' 4 If the taxpayer had a nontax-
avoidance business purpose, then the taxpayer's form should determine the
tax consequences of the transaction. If the taxpayer did not have such a
purpose, then the IRS may calculate the tax due by recasting the transac-
tion's form.
Gregory's so-called "nontax business purpose test" has been cited as the
basis of decision in literally hundreds of form and substance cases over the
decades.' 5 Its prolificacy notwithstanding, the test's authority and influence
are somewhat astonishing, when one begins to note its obvious defects.
To start, the test is difficult to enforce. Evidence of purpose is usually
9. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE
L.J. 440, 440 (1968).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 455 (1950).
11. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 324 (1945).
12. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
13. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 8, 4.3.4, at 4-44.
14. "[F]ixing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find? Sim-
ply an operation having no business or corporate purpose ...." 293 U.S. at 469.
15. See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 442, 438 n.20 (1949); Bohrer v.
Commissioner, 945 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir. 1991); Kirckman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486,
1490 (11 th Cir. 1989); Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1989); Estate of
Schneider v. Commissioner, 855 F.2d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1988); Paccar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 849
F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1988); Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 1977); Smith
v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1976); Phillips Bros. Chem., Inc. v. Commissioner,
435 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1970); Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 93, 100 (5th Cir.
1966); Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1959); Granite Trust Co. v. United
States, 238 F.2d 670, 674 (1st Cir. 1956).
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within the control of the taxpayer.' 6 Skillful lawyers are adept at construct-
ing and documenting nontax business purposes simply in order to qualify a
transactional form under the business purpose test. 17 Counsel can usually
advise the taxpayer in the early stages of a transaction to create a paper trail
demonstrating the requisite nontax business purpose. Thus, the test tends to
allow the well-advised taxpayer's form to control and to penalize the tax-
payer who fails to obtain the services of skilled tax counsel. I8
Furthermore, unless every assertion of nontax business purpose is to be
accepted, the business purpose test requires judges to decide which asserted
business purposes are valid and which are not. This decision may require
specialized knowledge in commerce and finance that may exceed the compe-
tence of most judges.
Finally, Gregory never really explained the logical relevance of the exist-
ence of a nontax business purpose to whether the taxpayer's form should
control. Nor is the relevance obvious. Taxation, after all, is generally a mat-
ter of objective economic circumstances. Taxpayers in similar economic cir-
16. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 301 (2d series 1938):
[S]uch tests actually stack the cards [against the Commissioner]; the advantage of sweep-
ing definitions and of whatever presumptions may be available to the government will
remain more than offset by the fact that the evidence as to motive is almost entirely in the
possession of the taxpayer, unless psychology devises a better mental X-ray than has so far
been discovered.
17. See Arthur M. Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J.
14, 25 (1952) ("It is an open secret that business purposes are often manufactured in the offices of
attorneys.").
18. In federal taxation, subjective tests of purpose or intent have proven notoriously difficult to
administer because of the inherent strategic advantage such tests provide taxpayers. Marshall him-
self referred to this problem in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1987). See
discussion infra Part II.c. For this reason, there has been a trend in some areas of the tax law
toward replacing subjective tests of taxpayer liability with more easily administered objective stan-
dards.
One area of tax law in which the trend toward objective tests can be seen is the deductibility of
educational expenses. Until 1967, the test for deductibility of educational expenses depended on the
taxpayer's intent. If the taxpayer intended to qualify for a new trade or business or a substantial
advancement in her position, then educational expenses were not deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
5(b) (1960) (prior to amendment by T.D. 6918, 32 Fed. Reg. 6697 (1967)). However, if the tax-
payer intended simply to improve her skills in her existing trade or business and did not intend to
enter a new trade or business or substantially advance in her position, then educational expenses
were deductible. Id. § 1.162-5(a). Under the approach mandated by the regulation, the expenses
could be deductible even if the education in fact did qualify the taxpayer to enter a new trade or
business. See Greenberg v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966) (expenses incurred in psy-
choanalysis training for psychiatrist who intended to remain a psychiatrist were deductible even
though training qualified taxpayer in new specialty). The current test is objective. Educational
expenses are deductible only if the training does not qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or busi-
ness, irrespective of what is intended. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967).
There has also been a shift to objective rather than subjective standards for determining the
carryover of corporate tax attributes. Congress enacted objective tests in I.R.C. § 382, which
largely supplant the tax avoidance motive test of I.R.C. § 269. I.R.C. §§ 269, 382 (CCH 1991).
1992] 2013
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
cumstances should have similar tax burdens. Therefore, the motives behind
a taxpayer's actions should be generally irrelevant.
Marshall squarely addressed the issue of form and substance twice, first in
1962 as a circuit court judge in Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 19 and then
eight years later when he wrote the Supreme Court's opinion in United States
v. Davis.20
A. NASSAU LENS CO. V. COMMISSIONER
In Nassau Lens, Harry Pildes incorporated his sole proprietorship, trans-
ferring assets worth $230,000 to a newly formed corporation, Nassau Lens
Co., Inc. (Nassau Lens). In return, Nassau Lens assumed the proprietor-
ship's $38,000 in liabilities, and transferred to Pildes $100,000 in debt securi-
ties plus $92,000 in common stock equity. 21 The principal issue was whether
Pildes's closely held debt should be regarded as genuine or recast as stock.22
Five years earlier, dissenting in Gilbert v. Commissioner,23 Judge Learned
Hand had endorsed the business purpose rule as the proper test for determin-
ing the validity of closely held debt: "When the petitioners decided to make
their advances in the form of debts, rather than of capital advances," Judge
Hand wrote, "did they suppose that the difference would appreciably affect
their beneficial interests in the venture, other than taxwise?" 24 In other
words, in creating the debt, did the shareholders have a nontax business
purpose?25
The Tax Court, appearing to follow the business purpose test endorsed by
Judge Hand, ruled that the closely held debt should be recast as stock if
Pildes lacked a nontax business purpose for the allocation of assets between
debt and equity. 26 Finding that Pildes's only purpose was tax avoidance, the
Tax Court decided for the IRS.27 It recast the debt as equity and thereby
disallowed the corporation's deduction for interest on closely held debt.
Then sitting as a Second Circuit Judge, Marshall reversed the Tax Court
19. 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962).
20. 397 U.S. 301 (1969).
21. Nassau Lens, 308 F.2d at 40-42.
22. Id. at 44.
23. 248 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
24. Id. at 412.
25. Eight years earlier, Judge Learned Hand explained the business purpose test: "The doctrine
of Gregory v. Helvering ... means that in construing words of a tax statute which describe commer-
cial or industrial transactions we are to understand them to refer to transactions entered upon for
commercial or industrial purposes and not to include transactions entered upon for no other motive
than to escape taxation." Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570,
572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 228 U.S. 955 (1950).
26. Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 268, 272-73 (1960), rev'd, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1962).
27. Id. at 273.
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and rejected its use of the business purpose test.28 He noted the practical
difficulty courts face in distinguishing valid from invalid business purposes:
"A cautious approach in this particular area of tax law is not entirely unjusti-
fied. To have each case turn solely on the existence or lack of a business
purpose might ultimately involve the courts in inquiries as to what is a justi-
fying business purpose and what is not."
'29
Marshall also questioned whether the nontax business purpose test was
logically relevant to whether closely-held debt should be recast as equity:
It is all very well to say that it makes very little "economic" difference
whether the investment here was divided between debt and equity or was
entirely allocated to equity. But by the same reasoning, it may make little
"economic" difference to Pildes whether he had an unincorporated busi-
ness or a corporation in which he is the sole stockholder. And if one
wanted to carry the argument far enough, presumably the Commissioner
would be free to make ad hoc attacks on a whole variety of transactions
involving closely held corporations. But th[e] Code does not so empower
the Commissioner, for it recognizes and treats corporations as separate en-
tities and affords significance to the type of investment chosen in them so
long as that investment has substantial economic reality in terms of the
objective factors which normally surround the type chosen.30
The business purpose test is particularly ill-suited to resolving whether
closely held debt should be accepted or recast as stock. With foresight, a
nontax business purpose can virtually always be demonstrated for closely
held debt. The most obvious example is the purpose of affording the close
corporation stockholder the same priority claim with respect to corporate
assets as other unsecured creditors. Pildes's failure to assert such a nontax
business purpose in his case is something of a mystery.
Even if the taxpayer's only motive for creating closely held debt is tax
avoidance, such a motive-as Marshall recognized-is logically irrelevant to
the question of whether the debt form should be respected for tax purposes.
The principal tax consequence of closely held debt is to permit a closely held
corporation to be treated as if it were an unincorporated business. Interest
on closely held debt is deductible by the corporation, 31 which reduces corpo-
rate income to the extent of interest expense, but taxable to the debt-holders,
who own the business.32 In effect, there is no separate tax on the corporation
as a business entity but merely a one-level tax at the owner level. Thus, the
tax avoidance inherent in the use of closely held debt (provided the debt
28. Nassau Lens, 308 F.2d at 46.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 46.
31. I.R.C. § 163(a) (CCH 1991).
32. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (CCH 1991).
20151992]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
bears an adequate rate of interest) is really no greater than the tax avoidance
inherent in the decision to operate a business in unincorporated rather than
corporate form to begin with.
For decades before Nassau Lens was decided, the practice of the IRS and
the courts had been to respect closely held debt provided that the corpora-
tion's inside debt to equity ratio-when the closely held debt was created-
was no more than 3 to 1.33 Looking at the specific case of Nassau Lens, the
debt to equity ratio-including both inside and outside debt-was only 138
to 92, or 1.5 to 1. Nassau Lens's total debt to equity ratio was rather modest,
less than one-half of the requisite 3 to 1 ceiling ratio for inside debt alone,
and therefore should have easily satisfied the IRS and the courts.
Why then did the IRS decide to litigate this case? The answer is that
Pildes was attempting to use closely held debt, not simply to cause his busi-
ness to be taxed as if it were unincorporated, but to defer any tax on a signifi-
cant portion of business income for a period of up to ten years. How was this
deferral to be accomplished? The debt securities paid zero stated interest,
were issued for a price of $1,000 apiece, and returned a principal amount of
$1,500 at maturity ten years later.34 All the interest was therefore repre-
sented by original issue discount, the $500 difference between the $1,000 is-
sue price and the $1,500 principle amount, payable only when the bonds
matured. Nassau Lens deducted the interest, as measured by the original
discount, ratably over the ten-year term of the debt. Pildes, the debt holder,
argued that he should not have to report the interest income until actually
paid at the end of the bonds' ten-year maturity.35 Thus, the accrual of inter-
est deductions by Nassau Lens, combined with deferral of interest income by
Pildes, would have caused business income not to be reported and taxed for
up to ten years. Pildes was attempting to avoid taxation of business income
by mismatching the corporation's deductions of interest expense with his re-
porting of interest income. Moreover, he did so at a time when Congress had
not yet enacted code provisions to prevent such mismatching.36
33. See BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.04 at 4-24 (5th ed. 1987) (a debt to equity ratio that does not
exceed 3 to 1 is assumed to withstand judicial scrutiny).
34. Nassau Lens, 308 F.2d at 41-42.
35. Id. at 42 (in its 1954 tax return, Nassau Lens deducted $4,904.10 as the amortization of the
original issue discount on the debentures, while the Pildeses, in their 1954 tax return, did not in-
clude any interest income from the debentures).
36. Congress eventually put a stop to this practice by enacting Code provisions designed to pre-
vent the mismatching of interest expense and interest income by a corporation and its debt-holders.
I.R.C. §§ 1272-1274 (CCH 1991) (bondholder required to report original issue discount interest
income on an economic accrual basis); cf id. § 1274A (debtor and lender permitted to elect to use
the cash method for deducting and reporting interest provided stated requirements are met). To-
day, these provisions would explicitly prevent Nassau Lens from deducting interest expense until
Pildes reported the interest. If Pildes used the cash method of accounting, then both parties could
2016 [Vol. 80:2011
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Might the IRS have used a more principled and more narrowly focused
tool than the business purpose test to challenge the mismatching of interest
deductions and interest income in Nassau Lens? Although Pildes was, like
the corporation, on the accrual method of accounting, 37 he had not reported
the interest income represented by original issue discount as it accrued. The
IRS therefore might have argued that, as an accrual method taxpayer, Pildes
had to report interest income as it accrued in order to clearly reflect his
income.38
Instead, the IRS tried to apply the business purpose test to the issue of
whether closely held debt should be recast as equity, in order to stop the
abuse caused by the mismatching of interest expense deductions and interest
income for which Congress had not yet enacted an adequate statutory rem-
edy. 39 However, the IRS should not have applied the business purpose test
to the debt versus equity area, where it had not been applied before, was
logically irrelevant, and was in any event available only because of Pildes's
apparent failure to claim a plausible business purpose. Marshall thus prop-
erly rejected the IRS's attempt at this unprincipled application of the busi-
ness purpose test.
B. UNITED STATES V. DAVIS
Two years after joining the Supreme Court in 1968, Justice Marshall wrote
the opinion in United States v. Davis, in which he revisited the question of
form and substance that he had addressed earlier in Nassau Lens. In Davis, a
corporation redeemed preferred stock from a shareholder who (with applica-
tion of attribution rules) was considered as owning one hundred percent of
the corporation's stock.41
A redemption is, in form, a sale of stock by the shareholder to the corpora-
elect to account for interest under the cash method by virtue of section 1274A(c). However, if
Pildes used the accrual method of accounting, the election would not be available and he would be
required to accrue interest income under section 1272. When Nassau Lens was litigated, however,
the relevant provisions had not yet been enacted.
Since both Nassau Lens and Pildes were on the accrual method of accounting, I.R.C.
§ 267(a)(2)--which requires matching of interest deductions with interest income in the case of
certain related taxpayers and which had already been enacted-did not apply to their case. Id.
§ 267.
37. Nassau Lens, 308 F.2d at 40.
38. Code section 446(b) empowers the IRS to change a taxpayer's accounting method if it does
not clearly reflect income. I.R.C. § 446(b) (CCH 1991). See BirrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 8,
105.1.4 (discussing IRS's ability to prescribe the method of accounting which clearly reflects a
taxpayer's income).
39. If the business purpose test had been applied to recast the debt as equity, there would have
been no interest deductions for Nassau Lens to accrue. Business income, previously reduced by
accruing interest expense, would thus have been fully taxable to the corporation.
40. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
41. 397 U.S. at 305-07.
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tion. A sale of stock ordinarily produces capital gain to the extent that the
amount realized exceeds the stock's adjusted basis.42 However, the Code
provides that the sale form of a redemption is to be respected for tax pur-
poses only if the redemption meets one of the tests specified in code section
302(b). 43 Otherwise, the sale form is disregarded and the redemption is taxed
as a dividend.44 The principal section 302(b) tests are mathematical, requir-
ing that the shareholder's proportionate interests be reduced by specified
amounts. However, in addition, section 302(b)(1) provides that a redemp-
tion qualifies for sale treatment if, under vague and logically circular lan-
guage, it is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The precise issue in Davis was whether a pro rata redemption (one that did
not reduce the shareholder's proportionate interest) was "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" under section 302(b)(1), simply by virtue of the
existence of a nontax business purpose.45 In other words, the question was
whether the nontax business purpose test would determine whether a pro
rata redemption was taxed according to its sale form or whether that form
would be disregarded and the redemption recast as a dividend.
Marshall construed the language of section 302(b)(1) to refer, not to
whether there was a nontax business purpose,46 but rather to whether the
redemption produced a substantial reduction in the shareholder's propor-
tionate interest:
If a corporation distributes property as a simple dividend, the effect is to
transfer the property from the company to its shareholders without a
change in the relative economic interests or rights of the stockholders.
Where a redemption has that same effect, it cannot be said to have satisfied
the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" requirement of § 302(b)(1).
Rather, to qualify for preferred treatment under that section, a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation.47
42. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (CCH 1991).
43. Id. § 302(a). Sales treatment is granted if: (1) the redemption is "not essentially equivalent
to a dividend"; (2) the redemption reduces the shareholder's proportionate interest by more than
20%, applying the attribution of stock ownership rules of section 318; or (3) the redemption termi-
nates the shareholder's stock interest, without the application of the attribution of stock ownership
rules of section 318(a)(1). Id. § 302(b).
At the time that Davis was decided, the rules granting shareholders capital gain treatment as a
result of a partial liquidation were contained in a separate provision, section 346, rather than in
sections 302(b)(4) and 302(e). Id. §§ 302(b)(4), 302(e).
44. Id. § 302(d).
45. 397 U.S. at 303-04.
46. Id. at 312-13.
47. Id. at 313; see also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends:
Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739, 747 (1969). Chirelstein noted:
The "not essentially equivalent [to a dividend]" test of Section 302(b)(1), though not lim-
ited in terms to non-pro rata redemptions, is generally thought to subsume the same crite-
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Marshall also emphasized, as he had earlier in Nassau Lens, the impracti-
cality of the business purpose test:
[M]any courts continued to find that distributions otherwise like a dividend
were not "essentially equivalent" if, for example, they were motivated by a
sufficiently strong nontax business purpose .... There was general disa-
greement, however, about what would qualify as such a purpose, and the
result was a case-by-case determination with each case decided "on the
basis of the particular facts of the transaction in question."
48
Together, Nassau Lens and Davis reflect an even-handed approach to tax
law, favoring neither taxpayer nor the IRS. It did not matter to Marshall
whether the IRS or the taxpayer proposed application of the business pur-
pose test: in Nassau Lens, it was the IRS, in Davis, the taxpayer. In both
cases, he rejected business purpose as irrelevant to determining whether the
taxpayer's form should be respected or recast.
II. CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
Justice Marshall's 1988 opinion in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner
49
is the leading Supreme Court case on the subject of capital gains and losses.
Marshall used the occasion to eliminate tax avoidance opportunities which
had been created thirty-three years earlier by the Supreme Court decision in
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner.50 Both of these cases deal with
two important issues. The first is how to categorize a borderline asset that
may not obviously be either capital or noncapital. The second is how to
prevent taxpayers from claiming that property is a capital asset when a gain
arises but a noncapital asset when there is a loss; that is, how to prevent
taxpayers from treating gains and losses inconsistently.
A. THE CORN PRODUCTS PROBLEM
The taxpayer, Corn Products Refining Company (Corn Products), a man-
ufacturer of corn products from raw corn, entered into futures contracts to
buy raw corn.5' Over the years, Corn Products often disposed of the futures
rion and to provide capital gain or loss for non-pro rata distributions which do not meet
the specific requirements of Sections 302(b)(2) or 302(b)(3) but which for other reasons
seem not to involve the avoidance of ordinary dividend income. Isolated redemptions of
part of the company's preferred stock, or redemptions of common which are pro rata only
because stock belonging to one independent or hostile family member is attributed to an-
other, are among the illustrations commonly given of the operation of Section 302(b)(1).
48. Davis, 397 U.S. at 309.
49. 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
50. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
51. Id. at 48.
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before the delivery date.52 Corn Products argued that the futures were capi-
tal assets and the gains therefrom were thus taxable at preferential capital
gains rates. 53 The IRS insisted that the futures were noncapital assets and
the gains were thus taxable as ordinary income.
The principal problem is that, if the futures are treated as capital assets,
Corn Products may be able to treat gains and losses inconsistently. If corn
prices rise, Corn Products can dispose of the futures and report the income
therefrom as a capital gain. Alternatively, if corn prices fall, Corn Products
can take delivery of the raw corn, use it to manufacture corn products and,
as illustrated below, effectively treat a capital loss as an ordinary deduction.
Assume that Corn Products enters a contract to purchase a specified
amount of raw corn in the future at a price of $1,000. Corn Products plans
to manufacture corn syrup that it has contracted to sell for $3,000. Suppose
that corn prices rise by $400 to $1,400, the future is sold for a $400 gain, and
raw corn is purchased in the spot market to meet the manufacturing commit-
ment. If the future is treated as a capital asset, then Corn Products has a
$400 capital gain from selling the future and (ignoring all costs except the
cost of raw corn) $1600 of ordinary income from selling corn syrup.
On the other hand, suppose that shortly before the future delivery date,
corn prices fall by $400 to $600, and Corn Products takes delivery under the
future, paying $1,000 for raw corn with a current market price of only $600.
When the corn syrup is sold, Corn Products shows ordinary profits from its
manufacturing operations of $2,000. If it had instead disposed of the future
and purchased raw corn in the spot market for $600, it would have had a
$400 capital loss on the future and $2,400 of ordinary income from selling
manufactured products. By taking delivery under the future rather than dis-
posing of it, Corn Products is able to offset the loss on the future against its
manufacturing income, effectively converting the capital loss into an ordi-
nary loss.
At this point, some characteristics of the Corn Products problem, which
can be described as the potential for inconsistent treatment of gains and
losses, should be noted. First, the problem arises only because the property
which the taxpayer claims as a capital asset is also of a type that can be used
in the taxpayer's ordinary business. One can imagine other cases in which
there is a similar abuse potential. For example, the steel manufacturer, who
invests in a coal mine, could sell the property if coal prices rise but use the
coal to manufacture steel if coal prices fall; or the paper manufacturer who
invests in forested property, could sell the property if wood prices rise, but
use the trees to manufacture paper if wood prices fall.
52. Id. at 49 n.5.
53. Id. at 49.
2020 [Vol. 80:2011
THURGOOD MARSHALL: TAX LAWYER
Second, as a practical matter, the ordinary investor in corn futures, who
does not also use corn as a raw material input in its ordinary business, lacks
the opportunity to treat gains and losses inconsistently. For example,
Chrysler, an automobile manufacturer, might decide to invest excess funds in
corn futures. Since Chrysler's ordinary business, the manufacture of
automobiles, does not use corn as a raw material input, there is no potential
for Chrysler to take delivery of the corn, use it in its manufacturing process,
and thereby achieve inconsistent treatment of gains and losses.
Third, the potential for inconsistent treatment in the Corn Products case
exists irrespective of Corn Products' motive in acquiring the futures. Corn
Products executives testified that the futures were acquired in order to hedge
against a rise in the cost of the raw corn used in the company's manufactur-
ing business. 54 But a "pure" investment purpose is also imaginable. Corn
Products might acquire futures simply because it has excess funds not cur-
rently required for its manufacturing operations. Rather than use such funds
to buy bonds or stocks, Corn Products may decide that it can earn greater
investment profits by investing in futures. This is especially likely if Corn
Products believes that it possesses more information about the market for
corn futures than about other possible investments.
However, even if its motive is to invest, Corn Products retains the ability
to take delivery if prices fall, and thereby convert capital losses into ordinary
losses. If the investment produces a loss, the taxpayer-because of its posi-
tion as a corn products manufacturer--could (instead of disposing of the
future) take delivery and pay an above-market price for the corn, which it
would then use to manufacture corn products. The loss (the difference be-
tween the current market price and the price specified in the future) would be
reflected in a larger cost of raw material inputs. The taxpayer would show
less ordinary income from selling its output, in effect converting the capital
loss into an ordinary loss. The taxpayer would not have to dispose of the
future and take a capital loss (the difference between the current market price
for corn and the price specified in the future), whereas the ordinary investor
is unable to avoid capital loss treatment.
Fourth, if the future is classified as a capital asset, the Corn Products prob-
lem could be resolved provided that taking delivery of the corn under the
future is treated as a realization event. Using the numerical example dis-
cussed above, if prices fall and Corn Products takes delivery, that would pro-
duce realization of a $400 capital loss. The taxpayer's basis for the raw corn
acquired on delivery would be $600, and ordinary income from manufactur-
ing would be $2,400, the same as if the future were disposed of at a loss and
raw corn purchased in the spot market.
54. Id. at 51.
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Fifth, realization has never been defined to include performance of a con-
tractual commitment to buy property at a set price. Therefore, a practical
way for a court to prevent inconsistent treatment of gains and losses is to
resolve the classification question in favor of categorizing the futures as non-
capital assets. Then, whether the taxpayer sells the future or takes delivery,
all gains and losses are effectively ordinary and the potential for inconsistent
treatment is eliminated.
B. THE CORN PRODUCTS OPINION
In an opinion by Justice Tom Clark, the Supreme Court held that the corn
futures were noncapital assets in the hands of the taxpayer. 55 However, the
principal ground for decision was the taxpayer's motive for entering into the
futures contracts, rather than the need to prevent inconsistent treatment of
gains and losses.56
Justice Clark's analysis conceded that the futures were not property sold
to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business and therefore
appeared to qualify as capital assets under the literal language of the Code.57
The Court, however, rejected a literal reading of the tax statute.58 Congress,
the Court reasoned, meant to tax the ordinary, or everyday, profits of a busi-
ness as ordinary income rather than capital gain. 59 The taxpayer's ordinary
business was to manufacture and sell corn products and the profits therefrom
were obviously taxable at ordinary income rates. Since acquisition of the
corn futures was integrally connected with that business, gain on the futures
was also taxable as ordinary income.
Both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner's futures
transactions to be an integral part of its business designed to protect its
manufacturing operations against a price increase in its principal raw mate-
rial and to assure a ready supply for future manufacturing
requirements ....
. . .[I]t is difficult to imagine a program more closely geared to a com-
pany's manufacturing enterprise or more important to its successful
operation.
... Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday
operation of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather
than capital gain or loss. 6°
55. Id. at 47.
56. Id. at 50-51.
57. Id. at 51-52.
58. Id. at 51 ("Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the literal language of
the exclusions set out in (the Code].").
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id. at 50, 52.
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Only in the ultimate paragraph of his opinion for the Court, did Justice
Clark acknowledge that the facts of Corn Products presented a consistency
problem, in which the taxpayer might claim capital gains treatment if the
futures rose in value but an ordinary loss if the futures showed a loss: "[I]f a
sale of the future created a capital transaction while delivery of the commod-
ity under the same future did not, a loophole in the statute would be created
"61
By making the taxpayer's motive or purpose the critical factor in defining
what is a capital asset, rather than focusing on the need to classify borderline
assets in a way that will prevent inconsistent treatment of gains and losses,
Justice Clark's opinion inadvertently created the potential for other taxpay-
ers to duplicate the Corn Products problem in different circumstances. For
example, a newspaper might purchase a paper company's stock in order to
obtain a long-term supply of newsprint from the paper company. 62 Ordina-
rily such stock would be considered a capital asset in the hands of the news-
paper. But, if the stock fell in value, the newspaper could produce evidence
of the business connection and, under Corn Products, claim an ordinary loss.
On the other hand, if the stock rose in value, the taxpayer could claim a
capital gain, and it would ordinarily be difficult for the IRS to know that
there was in fact a business motive.
Thus, the rationale of Corn Products suffers from the same basic defect as
the nontax business purpose test. Rules which rely on a demonstration of
taxpayer purpose put the IRS at an enormous disadvantage since such facts
are ordinarily within the taxpayer's control. 63
C. ARKANSAS BEST CORP. V. COMMISSIONER
In Arkansas Best, the taxpayer, a diversified holding company, acquired
nearly two-thirds of the stock of the National Bank of Commerce in 1968. 64
After 1972, when the bank experienced severe losses, the taxpayer contrib-
uted additional capital in return for more stock. In 1975, Arkansas Best sold
most of its bank stock at a loss. 65
The Tax Court conceded that the bank stock appeared to qualify as a capi-
tal asset under the literal language of the Code. However, the court found
that the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring stock after 1972 was not to make an
investment, but rather to keep the bank from insolvency and thereby pre-
61. Id. at 54.
62. See Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. CI. 1962) (stock of paper
company acquired by newspaper publisher to assure a supply of newsprint was not acquired for
investment purposes and therefore, in hands of taxpayer, is not a capital asset).
63. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
64. Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
65. Id. at 213-14.
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serve the taxpayer's business reputation.66 Therefore, relying on the Corn
Products business motive test, the court held that the stock acquired after
1972 was a noncapital asset and that the loss on such stock was an ordinary
lOSS. 67
Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, affirmed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's reversal of the Tax Court. In a stark departure from Corn Products,
Marshall denigrated the relevance of business purpose or motive as a deter-
mining factor in the classification of property as a capital asset:
[T]he business-motive test advocated by petitioner is subject to the same
kind of abuse [as] in Corn Products .... The hedger could garner capital-
asset treatment by selling the future and purchasing the commodity on the
spot market, or ordinary-asset treatment by taking delivery under the fu-
ture contract. In a similar vein, if capital stock purchased and held for a
business purpose is an ordinary asset, whereas the same stock purchased
and held with an investment motive is a capital asset, a taxpayer such as
Arkansas Best could have significant influence over whether the asset
would receive capital or ordinary treatment. Because stock is most natu-
rally viewed as a capital asset, the Internal Revenue Service would be hard
pressed to challenge a taxpayer's claim that stock was acquired as an in-
vestment, and that a gain arising from the sale of such stock was therefore
a capital gain. Indeed, we are unaware of a single decision that has applied
the business-motive test so as to require a taxpayer to report a gain from
the sale of stock as an ordinary gain. If the same stock is sold at a loss,
however, the taxpayer may be able to garner ordinary-loss treatment by
emphasizing the business purpose behind the stock's acquisition. The po-
tential for such abuse was evidenced in this case by the fact that as late as
1974, when Arkansas Best still hoped to sell the Bank stock at a profit,
Arkansas Best apparently expected to report the gain as a capital gain.68
To repeat Marshall's words, "stock is most naturally viewed as a capital
asset."' 69 This appears to mean that the bank stock should be classified as a
capital asset because it is the treatment which prevents the taxpayer from
treating gains and losses inconsistently. However, in Corn Products, Mar-
shall noted that the same central concern with preventing inconsistent treat-
ment required the opposite result of classifying the property in question as a
noncapital asset. 70
To summarize, both Corn Products and Arkansas Best involved arguably
borderline assets where the "correct" classification is not self-evident. If the
basis for decision is to be whether the property falls within the language of
66. Id. at 214-15.
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. at 222-23.
69. Id. at 222.
70. Id. at 222.
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the section 1221 exclusions, then reasonable arguments could be made either
for or against capital asset classification. Comparing the two cases, Marshall
seems to suggest that classifying the assets "correctly" may be less important
than preventing taxpayers from treating gains and losses inconsistently. He
rejects the Corn Products motive test which relies on facts uniquely within
the taxpayer's control and widens the opportunity for claiming a capital gain
if the property increases in value but an ordinary loss if it falls in value.
Instead, he argues for adopting the classification in each case which better
prevents inconsistent treatment of gains and losses. 71
71. The Supreme Court's opinion in Arkansas Best has been unfairly criticized for creating un-
certainty and confusion concerning the treatment of certain currency and interest rate hedges. See
Kenneth P. Brewer, "Best" Facts Make Bad Law, 39 TAX NOTES 403, 403 (1988); Alan W. Cath-
cart, Effect of Arkansas Best on Foreign Currency Transactions, 39 TAX NOTES 397, 398 (1988);
Kathleen Matthews, Treatment of Liability, Foreign Currency Hedges Awaits Resolution, 40 TAX
NOTES 778, 778 (1988).
To illustrate, a manufacturer may contract to be paid for its inventory in a foreign currency
rather than in dollars. In order to be certain of earning a fixed U.S. dollar amount regardless of
fluctuations in international exchange rates, the manufacturer may then decide to enter a foreign
currency hedge. Or a company may commit itself to lend money at an interest rate to be deter-
mined at some future date. In order to lock in a fixed return, the company may enter an interest
rate hedge. Before Arkansas Best was decided, such hedges were treated as producing ordinary
income and losses because of their connection with the taxpayer's business and therefore fell under
the Corn Products doctrine.
Arkansas Best reinterpreted Corn Products as restricted to hedges in a taxpayer's inventory. Be-
cause the corn futures in that case could be viewed as substitutes for, or the equivalent of, raw corn,
Marshall wrote that they should be treated exactly the same as raw corn, which would have been
considered part of the taxpayer's inventory and therefore excluded from capital asset treatment by
Code section 1221(2). Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 421 (1988). The inven-
tory exclusion obviously cannot encompass foreign currency or interest rate hedges, and so taxpay-
ers claimed that they were left uncertain about whether to treat such hedges as capital or noncapital
assets.
Nevertheless, both currency and interest rate hedges described above could easily fit within other
exceptions to capital asset treatment. The currency hedge can be viewed as falling within the sec-
tion 1221(4) exclusion for accounts receivable for inventory. The manufacturer's accrued right to
be paid for selling its inventory is an account receivable. The currency hedge, designed to ensure
that the account receivable reflects a fixed dollar amount, can be viewed as a substitute for, or
equivalent to, the account receivable-in the same way that the corn future in Corn Products can be
viewed as a substitute for, or equivalent to, raw corn.
Similarly, the interest rate hedge can be viewed as a substitute for interest income and therefore
treated under well established principles as producing ordinary income or loss rather than as a
capital transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965) (earned
original issue discount not entitled to capital gains treatment); Lee A. Sheppard, Liability Hedging
After Arkansas Best, 46 TAX NOTES 634, 635-36 (1990).
To the extent that confusion and uncertainty followed Arkansas Best, the responsibility appears
to lie, if at all, with the Internal Revenue Service. Following the Arkansas Best case, the IRS might
have provided technical advice that currency and interest rate hedges would be viewed as producing
ordinary gain or loss for the reasons explained above. However, the IRS declined to act. See Lee
A. Sheppard, Waiting for Guidance on Business Hedges After Arkansas Best? Don't Hold Your
Breath, Says Hood, 49 TAX NOTES 139, 140 (1990).
The IRS may have been reluctant to take such a step because, as a result of Marshall's opinion in
Arkansas Best, it noticed for the first time that such hedges could result in inconsistent treatment of
1992] 2025
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
III. REALIZATION
The realization principle-that gains and losses on property are accounted
for only when the property is sold or exchanged-is basic to our federal in-
come tax system. 72 During the first three decades of the modern income tax,
the Court, on repeated occasions, grappled with the issue of what constitutes
realization. 73 Then, after 1947, with its essential meaning taken for granted,
realization as a legal issue for the Court dropped out of sight.74
Marshall's 1991 opinion in Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner75 was
the first occasion in forty-four years on which the Court considered the
meaning of realization. The case had serious implications for the administra-
tion of the federal income tax. The IRS was asking the court to radically
reinterpret the meaning of realization.76 The IRS argued that an exchange of
different properties should not produce realization if the properties had
nearly identical expected risk and return. It proposed the new interpretation
in order to curb what it believed to be a particular abuse. 77
However, this proposed interpretation depended in part on taxpayer pur-
pose.78 Furthermore, even aside from its reliance on purpose, the interpreta-
tion lacked discernible, and therefore administrable, boundaries. 79 If the
interpretation had been accepted, it could have confused an already complex
gains and losses. If the hedge produced a gain, the taxpayer could dispose of the hedge and claim to
have simply made an investment. If the hedge produced a loss, the taxpayer would disclose the
connection between the currency hedge and selling inventory or between the interest hedge and
lending money and claim an ordinary deduction.
The best solution to resolving this inconsistency problem might be for the IRS to recommend that
the Code be amended to require taxpayers to label such hedges as either capital or noncapital when
entered. Clear advance labeling would then prevent taxpayers from claiming either capital or ordi-
nary treatment after the fact, depending on whether the hedge showed a gain or loss. Cf I.R.C.
§ 1236 (CCH 1991) (permitting a dealer in securities to hold some securities as investments pro-
vided they are clearly labeled as such).
72. See, e.g., BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 8, § 5.2 at 5-17 ("realization is so basic to the
structure of the [tax] law that the principle is not challenged").
73. See, e.g., Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940);
Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936); Marr v.
United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920).
74. The last case before 1991 in which realization was even implicitly an issue was McWilliams v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947). For a discussion of McWilliams, see infra Part III.A.
75. 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
76. Id. at 1507 (Commissioner argued that requirement of a material difference in exchanged
properties precluded realization when exchange involved "essentially economic substitutes").
77. Id. at 1506-07 (under federal regulatory directive, savings and loans, for financial reporting
purposes, need not report losses on mortgages exchanged for "substantially identical" mortgages,
even though exchanges would generate tax losses).
78. Id. at 1509 (Commissioner argued that material difference in properties should be deter-
mined, in part, by "the attitudes of the parties").
79. Id. at 1510 (Commissioner's approach at odds with "goal of administrative convenience that
underlies the realization requirement").
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area of tax law. In addition, there is some question as to whether the prob-
lem in the case was an abuse of the tax system or rather an abuse of nontax
financial accounting.
Marshall, therefore, wisely rejected the new interpretation of the realiza-
tion requirement proposed by the IRS.80 Since Marshall was building on a
foundation created some decades earlier by the Supreme Court decisions in
Higgins v. Smith8 1 and McWilliams v. Commissioner, 82 those two cases will
be discussed first.
A. HIGGINS V. SMITH AND MCWILLIAMS V. COMMISSIONER
In Higgins v. Smith, the taxpayer (Smith) sold securities at a loss to his
wholly-owned corporation. The issue was whether the property had been
sold so that the loss was realized and therefore deductible by Smith.8 3 Writ-
ing for the Court in 1940, Justice Stanley F. Reed held that there was a sale
only in form and not in substance, since a corporation which the taxpayer
controlled continued to own the securities:
Title, we shall assume, passed to [the corporation] but the taxpayer re-
tained the control. Through the corporate forms he might manipulate as
he chose the exercise of shareholder's rights in the various corporations,
issuers of the securities, and command disposition of the securities them-
selves. There is not enough of substance in such a sale finally to determine
a loss.
[T]he Government may not be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's
election of that form for doing business which is most advantageous to him.
The Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the
form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event
is unreal or a sham may ... disregard the effect of the fiction .... It is
command of income and its benefits which marks the real owner of
property. 84
Thus, Higgins v. Smith stands for the proposition that when a taxpayer sells
property to a controlled or related party at a loss, there is not enough of a
sale in substance, and the loss may not be deducted since the taxpayer may
continue to exercise dominion over the property and effectively continue to
own it.
Seven years after Higgins v. Smith, in 1947, the Court considered an analo-
80. Id. at 1509-11.
81. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
82. 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
83. Smith, 308 U.S. at 474-75.
84. Id. at 476-78.
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gous problem in McWilliams v. Commissioner."5 The taxpayer sold shares of
stock and his spouse bought the same number and kind of shares. Both
transactions occurred almost simultaneously on the open market. The issue
again was whether a real sale had occurred so that the loss was deductible.8 6
Had the taxpayer simply sold the stock to his spouse, there would have been
no question that the loss was not deductible, either under the principle of
Higgins v. Smith, or under the statutory codification of that principle in the
antecedent of current section 267 of the Code, which disallows losses on the
sale of property between related parties.8 7
The chief difference with the facts of Higgins v. Smith was that McWil-
liams did not sell his stock to his spouse, and his spouse did not buy her stock
from him. Rather, each bought and purchased shares on the open market.88
Thus, the precise shares sold by the taxpayer were not the precise shares
purchased by the taxpayer's spouse. The spouse had merely purchased the
same number and kind of shares in the same company. However, because
the property sold and acquired by the related parties was fungible, the Court
treated the case as if the spouse had in fact purchased the exact same prop-
erty from the taxpayer.89 Therefore, the Court held that in effect there had
been a sale to an unrelated buyer only in form, not in substance, and that the
husband's loss could not be deducted.90
Higgins v. Smith and McWilliams were the Supreme Court precedents
most directly on point when Cottage Savings reached the Court. Under Hig-
gins v. Smith, no loss was deductible when the taxpayer sold property to a
controlled or related party. Under McWilliams, the same result applied
when the taxpayer sold and his spouse simultaneously acquired fungible
property.
B. COTTAGE SAVINGS ASS'N V. COMMISSIONER
The taxpayer, Cottage Savings, was a federally regulated savings and loan
institution. Cottage Savings held a portfolio of home mortgage loans that
had fallen in value when interest rates rose dramatically during the late
1970s. Pursuant to a Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) regulatory
directive regarding exchanges of substantially identical mortgages with other
lenders, Cottage Savings exchanged its existing mortgage portfolio for a new
portfolio of different mortgages with virtually identical risk and expected re-
85. 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
86. Id. at 695-96.
87. I.R.C. § 267 (CCH 1991).
88. 331 U.S. at 695.
89. Id. at 698-99.
90. Id. at 700-01.
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turn characteristics.9 ' The issue was whether the exchange qualified as a
realization in substance, permitting deduction of the 1oss.92
The IRS argued that, because there was no change in the underlying eco-
nomic position of Cottage Savings, there was no realization in substance.
9 3
This argument involved a dramatic modification and expansion of previous
interpretations of what constitutes a mere realization in form without a reali-
zation in substance. Unlike the taxpayer in Higgins v. Smith, Cottage Sav-
ings did not retain control or command over the specific property that it sold
or exchanged. 94 Nor were the two mortgage portfolios-the one traded and
the one received-fungible in the same sense as the properties in Mc Wil-
liams. The stock sold by McWilliams and the stock purchased by his spouse
involved the same kind of shares in the same company. In Cottage Savings,
the mortgages, although sharing virtually identical economic characteristics,
did have different obligers and were secured by different properties.9 5 It was
as if the stock sold and purchased by the McWilliamses involved different
companies, with different specific assets and liabilities, but with the same risk
and expected return and conducting the same type of business.
The IRS believed that its new interpretation of realization was justified by
the taxpayer's inconsistent treatment of the loss. Cottage Savings claimed
that the loss was realized and therefore was deductible for federal income tax
purposes. At the same time, the taxpayer treated the loss as not realized and
therefore not reportable for financial accounting purposes.
96
The FHLBB, the entity responsible for financial regulation of the savings
and loan industry, had encouraged Cottage Savings's actions. The FHLBB
used its regulatory authority to provide that losses from mortgage swap
transactions-which it believed would be deductible for federal tax pur-
poses-would not have to be realized for financial reporting purposes. The
FHLBB's only objective in promoting the mortgage swaps was to enable Cot-
tage Savings (and other savings and loans) to report a tax loss without re-
cording the loss on its balance sheet.9 7 This would provide significant cash
91. Cottage Sav., 111 S. Ct. at 1506.
92. Id. at 1507-08. Code section 1001(a) defines "[tihe gain [or loss] from the sale or other
disposition of property" as the difference between "the amount realized" and the "adjusted basis."
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (CCH 1991). Under Treasury Regulation 1.1001-1, a gain or loss is considered
realized on an exchange of property only if the properties exchanged are "different materially either
in kind or in extent." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (1972). Thus, the precise issue in Cottage Savings was
whether the exchanged mortgages were materially different under the regulation.
93. Cottage Sav., Ill S. Ct. at 1507.
94. Each party to the exchange continued to service the loans which it had exchanged. Id. at
1506 n.3. The Commissioner did not contend that this activity constituted a retention of control
over the property.
95. Id. at 1511.
96. Id. at 1506-07.
97. Id. at 1506. In a memorandum describing the mortgage swaps transactions, an FHLBB
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benefits to financially strapped savings and loans in the form of tax refunds
without adverse balance sheet consequences, which could otherwise require
the savings and loan's closure.98
Finding for the taxpayer, Marshall held that the loss on the mortgage port-
folio was realized because the new portfolio conferred "legally distinct enti-
tlements." 99 He rejected the IRS's position that realization does not occur
on an exchange of nonfungible properties with the same economic
characteristics.10 0
Marshall also noted practical difficulties with the IRS position. If the ex-
changed properties are not fungible, how does one determine whether they
have the same economic characteristics? Which economic characteristics are
relevant? Further, how does one determine whether the properties, with re-
spect to the relevant characteristics, are sufficiently alike?
The IRS suggested that it would examine how the parties regarded the
transaction.10 ' In Cottage Savings, if the parties to the transaction, the
FHLBB, and the secondary mortgage market regarded the two mortgage
portfolios as economically identical, then they should also be treated as iden-
tical for federal income tax purposes. t0 2 Marshall predictably objected to
what he termed "such a subjective test":
In order to apply the Commissioner's test in a principled fashion, the Com-
missioner and the taxpayer must identify the relevant market, establish
whether there is a regulatory agency whose views should be taken into ac-
count, and then assess how the relevant market participants and the agency
would view the transaction. The Commissioner's failure to explain how
these inquiries should be conducted further calls into question the worka-
bility of his test.'0 3
Of course, applying the test proffered by the IRS to the facts of Cottage
Savings would not have been a problem. The taxpayer had openly claimed
that the swapped mortgages had identical economic characteristics. The
FHLBB in fact required such a claim in order for the taxpayer to avoid re-
porting the losses for purposes of nontax financial accounting. On the other
official stated: "Our objective ... was to structure a transaction which was as close as possible to
the IRS 'materially different' definition which would still not change the economic position of the
association after it engaged in the swap." Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372, 376
(1988), rev'd, 890 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991).
98. 111 S. Ct. at 1506. Ordinarily, under generally accepted accounting principles, losses real-
ized on exchanges of properties-even fungibles-must be reported. However, reporting would
have rendered many savings and loans insolvent and, therefore, required that the FHLBB shut
them down. Id.
99. Id. at 1511.
100. Id. at 1510.
101. Id. at 1509-10.
102. Id. at 1511.
103. Id. at 1510-11.
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hand, accepting the IRS test and restricting its application to similar transac-
tions would treat Cottage Savings (and other savings and loans) inconsis-
tently and arbitrarily compared to taxpayers whose situations would not
require such an admission.
Even aside from questions of practicality, our tax law has consistently
treated losses as realized even if the taxpayer replaces the property sold with
other property with nearly identical economic characteristics. For example,
an investor might sell stock that has fallen in value and immediately acquire
a different stock with essentially the same risk and return characteristics. Or
an investor in land that has fallen in value might sell the land and promptly
acquire other land of a similar type and location. In both cases, provided
that the property is sold in substance as well as in form so that command or
control over it is surrendered, and so long as the new property is not fungible
with respect to the property sold, then the losses may be deducted.'
°4
Obviously, realization could be defined very differently. One can imagine
a tax system under which the replacement of property with other property
with identical economic characteristics is generally not considered an appro-
priate occasion for taking losses into account. Nevertheless, our tax law has
consistently treated such losses as realized. A fundamental revision of the
definition of realization should therefore be made by Congress amending the
Code, rather than by unilateral IRS action.
Cottage Savings does involve an egregious abuse of accounting practices.
Generally accepted accounting principles universally require losses on prop-
erty to be reported no later than when the property is sold or exchanged.
For the FHLBB to encourage institutions to conceal realized losses for finan-
cial reporting purposes was grossly irresponsible. 10 5 Nevertheless, it is diffi-
cult to see why the FHLBB's abuse of its regulatory authority in the area of
financial reporting should mean that Cottage Savings and other savings and
104. An earlier Court of Appeals decision on this issue noted that the Commissioner's position
would radically alter notions of what constitutes realization:
Exchanges of items which were clearly different would not necessarily constitute realiza-
tion events. For example, if two taxpayers exchanged two bonds of different corporate
entities engaged in entirely different businesses, but which have the same rating by
Moody's, the same interest rate, the same cash flow, the same maturity and the same value
in the capital market then no change in their "economic status" would have occurred.
San Antonio Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577, 590 (5th Cir. 1989).
105. In fact, where the public has an interest in knowing whether an enterprise faces insolvency,
prudent accounting would require the disclosure even of unrealized losses. Thus, the FHLBB prob-
ably should have required the savings and loan institutions to disclose large unrealized losses on
their mortgage portfolios in order to protect public depositors. Its failure to require reporting of
such unrealized losses is questionable enough. To authorize the nondisclosure of losses that have
actually been realized was blatant dishonesty that helped conceal the festering savings and loan
debacle.
20311992]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
loans may not take an allowable tax deduction. Recognizing this, Justice
Marshall quite properly found for the taxpayers in this case.
IV. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
Marshall's work in the charitable contribution area is paradoxical. His
most important opinion and the leading case, Hernandez v. Commissioner, to6
involved the intersection of the tax law and constitutional rights. Marshall,
generally regarded as a guardian of civil rights and constitutional liberties,
but not often regarded as a tax lawyer, seems to have gotten the tax part
right but the constitutional part wrong. While correctly analyzing the prin-
ciples governing the tax issues, he was surprisingly insensitive to the possible
violation of constitutional rights.
There were two principle questions in Hernandez: whether expenditures
by members of the Church of Scientology were charitable contributions or
personal consumption; and whether denial of a deduction for such expendi-
tures discriminated against the Church of Scientology. Since Marshall's
opinion relied on earlier decisions distinguishing charitable contributions
from personal consumption, including his own opinion in United States v.
American Bar Endowment, 10 7 this preexisting body of law deserves brief
examination.
A. DEFINING CHARITY
The Code requires that, in order for the taxpayer to claim a deduction, a
charitable contribution must go to an organization that qualifies for tax-ex-
empt status under section 501(c)(3).10 8 But the Code does not further define
the term "charitable contribution." Long before Marshall's opinions in
American Bar Endowment and Hernandez, the IRS had ruled, and lower
courts had consistently held, that such contributions are deductible only to
the extent that the taxpayer does not receive in return a quid pro quo consist-
ing of valuable goods or services.10 9
In practice, however, this quid pro quo rule is widely violated, and IRS
106. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
107. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
108. Code section 170(c)(2) includes organizations "operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals[,] no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual .... " I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)
(CCH 1991). This list is substantially that of section 501(c)(3) organizations.
109. In Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, the IRS stated that a charitable contribution is de-
ductible only to the extent that it exceeds the market value of any benefit received in return. Cited
with approval in Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972); Singer Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249 (1970).
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enforcement has been discouragingly ineffective. 0 In general, charities in-
form donors that their contributions are deductible "to the extent permitted
by law.""' The donor is left to figure out the hidden meaning of "extent
permitted," that is, that the contribution may be deducted only to the extent
that it exceeds the value of goods and services received in return.
Complicating matters further, the IRS explicitly recognizes an exception
to the quid pro quo rule when the contribution is made to a religious institu-
tion and the quid pro quo consists of religious benefits."t 2 For example,
church and synagogue members are permitted to deduct the full amount of
membership dues, including pew rents and tickets which entitle members to
particular seats during religious services, entirely without regard to the value
of the benefits received in return. 13
This recognized exception to the quid pro quo rule has been justified by a
doubtful assertion: religious services do not provide significant economic
benefits to the donor.
[R]eligious observances generally are not regarded as yielding private bene-
fits to the donor, who is viewed as recognizing only incidental benefits
when attending the observances. The primary beneficiaries are viewed as
being the general public and members of the faith. Thus, payments for
saying masses, pew rents, tithes, and other payments involving fixed dona-
tions for similar religious services are fully deductible contributions.
14
What justifies the claim that pew rents and high holiday tickets sold by
churches and synagogues necessarily fail to provide significant economic ben-
efits to the donor as compared with tickets to a museum or a symphony
110. See, e.g., Deductible to the Extent Permitted By Law, 38 TAx NOTES 1557, 1557 (1988)
(author anonymous) (calling for end to allowing deduction of charitable contributions when contri-
butions are given in exchange for tickets to benefit dinners, benefit auctions, and free lectures).
11. Id. at 1557. For the latest IRS attempt to achieve better compliance, see Rev. Proc. 90-12,
1990-1 C.B. 471 (providing guidelines explaining when an item given in exchange for contribution
will be deemed to have no fair market value so that charities can advise taxpayers to what extent
their contributions are deductible).
112. A.R.M. 2, 1 C.B. 150 (1919) (pew rents, assessments, and church dues are contributions and
not the hiring of a seat for personal accommodation, because their real intent is contributory); Rev.
Rul. 70-74, 1970-1 C.B. 49; cf Rev. Rul. 71-580, 1971-2 C.B. 235 (church which compiles genealog-
ical information of members in order to conduct religious ordinances in accordance with church
doctrine, as well as the saying of mass or conduct of similar religious observances, is providing a
spiritual benefit to all members of the faith, so that any benefit to the family is incidental; the church
is therefore accomplishing a charitable purposes and qualifies for the tax-exempt status).
113. Rev. Rul. 70-74, 1970-1 C.B. 49.
114. IRS Official Explains New Examination-Education Program on Charitable Contributions to
Tax Exempt Organizations, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 186, at J-I (Sept. 26, 1988); see also Staples
v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1987) (religious observances considered to be of
spiritual benefit to general public as well as members of the faith, with the private benefit to individ-
ual participants being merely incidental to the broader good that is served); id. ("cases and legisla-
tive history in discussing payments which are not deductible generally have referred to a material,
financial, or economic benefit being received in return").
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orchestra?" 5 The only meaningful indicator of economic value is whether
people are in fact willing to pay for the service. If individuals are prepared to
pay, then the service appears to provide a significant economic benefit,
whether labeled religious or not. The absence of economic benefit cannot be
demonstrated by reference to some external criterion which describes the cul-
tural context in which the service is provided, such as the fact that the service
is religious.
There is an extraordinarily difficult problem in this area, but it is essen-
tially an administrative one which is not limited to religious services. It is
the problem of assigning a fair market value to a quid pro quo or return
benefit, received in the context of a charitable contribution. Such a value
must be ascertained in order to determine how much of the contribution is
deductible.
When the quid pro quo consists of items that are generally provided to the
public on the open market in a noncharitable commercial context, then as-
certaining the fair market value is relatively simple. Such value equals the
price generally charged in the open market for the item. However, valuation
difficulties arise when there is no such market reference because the item is
not generally available except from a charity. For example, the kinds of spe-
cial services provided to sponsors of tax-exempt symphony orchestras and
ballets-such as attendance at rehearsals and priority in buying tickets-are
not generally sold in a noncharitable, commercial context. Similarly, reli-
gious services provided to church and synagogue members are not ordinarily
sold in a noncharitable, commercial context.
In both of these cases, the IRS faces the difficulty of assigning a fair mar-
ket value to the quid pro quo in the absence of an obvious market bench-
mark. But this valuation problem is inherently no greater in the case of
religious institutions than in the case of the orchestra or the ballet. There-
fore, the difficulty of valuing return benefits does not by itself justify an ex-
ception to the quid pro quo rule which automatically regards all religious
services as providing zero economic benefit to the donor.
There may exist, however, constitutional reasons for creating such an ex-
ception to the quid pro quo rule. The petitioner in Hernandez argued:
The ... suggestion-that religious services may be valued by reference to
"the price set by providers of similar services"-is... unconstitutional....
115. This claim cannot be justified on the ground that individuals may obtain the religious serv-
ices in question without having to pay for them. Attendance at many high holiday services, for
example, is typically restricted to ticket holders. Those who do not pay for tickets are denied
entrance and may not attend. Brief for the Petitioners at 23, Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S.
680 (1989) (No. 87-963). In addition, Mormons who fail to tithe are denied access to the Taberna-
cle. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 n.4 (1987); Petitioners Brief at 21, Hernandez (No. 87-963).
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[T]he very notion of comparing relative values of religious services imper-
missibly entangles church and state both through the valuation of religious
services and through the creation of denominational preferences. Finally,
valuing services based on the "costs of providing the services," also would
create constitutional difficulties. Determining the cost of providing services
would require deep intrusions into a church's finances and operations, cre-
ating excessive and unconstitutional church-state entanglement."
16
Thus, the religious services exception to the quid pro quo rule may avoid
excessive government entanglement in religious affairs which could arise if
valuation of religious practice were an issue. This constitutional argument
provides a much more solid ground for the religious services exception to the
quid pro quo rule than the doubtful assertion that such services do not pro-
vide the donor with economic benefits.
B. UNITED STATES V AMERICAN BAR ENDOWMENT
The Supreme Court first directly considered the quid pro quo rule in
United States v. American Bar Endowment.' 7 American Bar Endowment
(ABE) is a section 501(c)(3) organization which promotes legal research. All
members of the American Bar Association are also automatically members
of ABE. 18
ABE sold life, health, and medical insurance to its members and con-
tracted with private insurance companies to provide the actual coverage.' 19
The rates that ABE charged its members for insurance were equivalent to
rates charged by commercial insurance companies. 120 However, ABE was
able to pay private insurance companies much less than it charged its indi-
vidual members because of its superior bargaining power and because the
group took advantage of the membership's lower than average mortality and
morbidity rates. 12 1 ABE used funds generated by the difference between the
rates it charged its members and the cost of policies to finance its research
program. 122 One issue the Court faced was whether ABE members could
deduct, as a charitable contribution, the difference between their cost of in-
surance and the actual cost to ABE.
123
In his opinion for the Court, Marshall ruled that the difference was not
deductible. 124 Since ABE charged the same rates as commercial insurance
116. Petitioners Brief at 40 n.55, Hernandez (No. 87-963) (citations omitted).
117. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
118. Id. at 107.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 108.
121. Id. at 107-08.
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id. at 106-07, 109.
124. Id. at 119.
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companies, ABE members received a quid pro quo equal to the full extent of
what they paid.' 25 Therefore, there was no excess of the amount paid over
the value of the benefit received that would constitute a deductible charitable
contribution. 26
C. HERNANDEZ V. COMMISSIONER
Instead of conventional religious services, the Church of Scientology
(Church) uses "auditing" and "training" sessions to develop its members'
spiritual awareness. 27 The principle issue in Hernandez was whether the
taxpayers, members of the Church, were entitled to deduct as charitable con-
tributions payments made to the Church for their participation in these
sessions. 128
As in American Bar Endowment, Marshall construed the Code as permit-
ting a charitable contribution deduction only to the extent that taxpayers do
not receive an economic benefit in return for their contribution. 29 Marshall
explicitly rejected the taxpayers' claim that the quid pro quo or return benefit
analysis has no place when there is a payment for the right to participate in a
religious service:
[I]t finds no support in the language of [the Code] .... Congress has
specified that a payment to an organization operated exclusively for reli-
gious (or other eleemosynary) purposes is deductible only if such a payment
is a "contribution or gift." The Code makes no special preference for pay-
ments made in the expectation of gaining religious benefits or access to a
religious service. ' 30
Having rejected the idea of an exception to the quid pro quo rule for reli-
gious benefits, Marshall failed to address the argument forcefully made by
petitioner that determining what portion of the donation represents the
"value" of the religious exercise being purchased and what portion represents
a contribution might entangle the government in religious affairs.' 3 ' He re-
125. Id. at 118.
126. Id. at 116, 118.
127. 490 U.S. at 685.
128. Id. at 684.
129. Id. at 690-91.
130. Id. at 692-93 (citations omitted).
131. This omission may be explained by the multitude of facts which could have been taken to
show there was no payment in excess of the value of the benefits received in the particular case of
Hernandez.
As the Tax Court found, these payments were part of a quintessential quid pro quo ex-
change: in return for their money, petitioners received an identifiable benefit, namely,
auditing and training sessions. The Church established fixed price schedules for [these]
sessions ... it calibrated particular prices to... sessions of particular lengths and levels of
sophistication; it returned a refund if auditing and training services went unperformed; it
distributed "account cards" on which persons who had paid money to the Church could
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ferred only to the entanglement problems that an exception to the quid pro
quo rule for religious services might create:
Finally, the deduction petitioners seek might raise problems of entangle-
ment between church and state. If framed as a deduction for those pay-
ments generating benefits of a religious nature for the payor, petitioners'
proposal would inexorably force the IRS and reviewing courts to differenti-
ate "religious" benefits from "secular" ones. If framed as a deduction for
those payments made in connection with a religious service, petitioners'
proposal would force the IRS and the judiciary into differentiating "reli-
gious" services from "secular" ones.... [W]e do note that "pervasive mon-
itoring" for "the subtle or overt presence of religious matter" is a central
danger against which we have held the Establishment Clause guards."
1 32
Also troubling was Marshall's refusal to consider the petitioners' claim
that the IRS had discriminated against the Church of Scientology. To sup-
port the discrimination claim (made only on appeal) the taxpayers placed in
the record copies of IRS Revenue Rulings that allowed a charitable contribu-
tion deduction for payments for pew rents and high holiday tickets. 133 Mar-
shall, who was a stickler for procedural technicalities,134 held that this record
was not sufficient to demonstrate that the IRS had in fact permitted followers
of more conventional religious faiths to deduct in full payments for religious
services without application of the quid pro quo rule:
Perhaps because the theory of [discrimination] emerged only on appeal,
petitioners did not endeavor at trial to adduce from the IRS or other
sources any specific evidence about other religious faiths' transactions. The
IRS' revenue rulings, which merely state the agency's conclusions as to
deductibility and which have apparently never been reviewed by the Tax
Court or any other judicial body, also provide no specific facts about the
nature of these other faiths' transactions. In the absence of such facts, we
simply have no way (other than the wholly illegitimate one of relying on
our personal experiences and observations) to appraise accurately whether
the IRS' revenue rulings have correctly applied a quid pro quo analysis with
respect to any or all of the religious practices in question. We do not know,
for example, whether payments for other faiths' services are truly obliga-
monitor what prepaid services they had not yet claimed; and it categorically barred provi-
sion of. . .sessions for free. Each of these practices reveals the inherently reciprocal
nature of the exchange.
Id. at 691-92 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 694 (citation omitted). The entanglement test used in Hernandez has been called into
question. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (religious prayer at public school
graduation ceremony violated Establishment Clause).
133. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 701.
134. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy & Martha Minow, Thurgood Marshall and Procedural Law:
Lawyers'Lawyer, Judge's Judge, 6 HARv. BLACKLETFER J. 95, 97-100 (1989) (speculating as to the
causes of Marshall's commitment to precision in procedural matters).
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tory or whether any or all of these services are generally provided whether
or not the encouraged "mandatory" payment is made.' 35
Justice O'Connor's dissent took the view that the discrimination issue had
been posed:
[The Court] has chosen to ignore both longstanding, clearly articulated
IRS practice, and the failure of [the government] to offer any cogent, neu-
tral explanation for the IRS' refusal to apply this practice to the Church of
Scientology. Instead, the Court has pretended that whatever errors in ap-
plication the IRS has committed are hidden from its gaze .... In my view,
the IRS has misapplied its longstanding practice of allowing charitable
contributions . . . in a way that violates the Establishment Clause. It has
unconstitutionally refused to allow payments for the religious service [of
Scientology] to be deducted as charitable contributions in the same way it
has allowed fixed payments to other religions to be deducted. 136
There is a possible explanation for Marshall's decision not to consider the
issue of unconstitutional discrimination. Charitable contributions are de-
ductible to begin with only if the recipient organization qualifies as tax-ex-
empt under Code Section 501(c)(3). 137 In previous litigation, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that leaders of the Church had diverted
church funds for their own use and that therefore the Church's principal
branch, located in California, did not qualify as a section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion.13 8 Thus, contributions to the California branch were not made to a
qualified section 501(c)(3) organization and were therefore not deductible.
That decision did not affect the tax-exempt status of other church
branches, including the branch which received payments from the taxpayer
in Hernandez. 139 For purposes of Hernandez, the IRS had stipulated that the
Scientology Church branch did qualify as a section 501(c)(3) organization. 140
In effect, the government, for mysterious reasons had all but stipulated away
its case. The stipulation barred the Court from explicitly considering a more
plausible ground for denying deduction of the contributions in Hernandez,
namely that the Scientology Church branch in this case also failed to qualify
as a section 501(c)(3) organization. Marshall, however, certainly knew of the
decision with respect to the California branch of the Church. 141 As a result,
he may not have regarded the Church as a bona fide section 501(c)(3)
organization.
135. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 702.
136. Id. at 713 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
138. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315-19 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
139. 490 U.S. at 686 & n.4.
140. Id. at 686.
141. Marshall cited Church of Scientology, 823 F.2d 1310, in Hernandez. Id. at 686 n.4.
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In sum, while Marshall may be open to criticism for his handling of the
constitutional issues in Hernandez, his treatment of the tax question was
commendable. He affirmed the general rule that charitable contributions are
deductible only to the extent that the payment exceeds the value of benefits
received. Moreover, he properly rejected the conventional wisdom that reli-
gious benefits inherently lack economic value. Hernandez is a useful and
long overdue admonition to the IRS: enforce the general quid pro quo rule
with more consistency and rigor and reexamine whether payments to
churches and synagogues for bona fide religious services should always be
treated as fully deductible charitable contributions, without regard to appli-
cation of the quid pro quo rule.
CONCLUSION
Specialists in federal income taxation who reviewed this article generally
agreed with its conclusions about the importance of Marshall's work. How-
ever, specialists whose field is the Supreme Court have reacted somewhat
differently.
One reaction has been to attribute the number of significant tax opinions
by Marshall to the refusal of Chief Justices to assign him more important
tasks in constitutional law. A few years after the liberal Marshall joined the
Court, it is noted, the moderately conservative Warren Burger was appointed
Chief Justice. Moreover, the even more conservative William Rhenquist suc-
ceeded Burger. In other words, it is asserted, Justice Marshall was forced to
write on federal income tax because he was given nothing better to do.
I am not sure how the claim is relevant to an evaluation of Marshall's
work. The quality of his opinions surely is independent of whether Marshall
welcomed the chance to write opinions on federal taxation or was unenthu-
siastic. In fact, if Marshall was drafted into writing tax opinions, the high
quality of his work-that he allegedly did not seek or want-might seem all
the more impressive.
Another reaction that I have encountered is that Marshall himself did not
write the opinions in the tax area but relied on his clerks. I find this second
point even more puzzling than the first. Given the Court's workload, nearly
every Justice for the past two or three decades has relied on clerks for a great
deal of research and writing. Why is one Justice, Thurgood Marshall, in one
area, federal taxation, singled out as having depended on his clerks? Mar-
shall served for four years on the court of appeals and more than two decades
on the Supreme Court. Surely, the consistent quality of his opinions in fed-
eral taxation over this long a period suggests that he himself must have
played a significant role in the preparation and writing of his opinions.
A third reaction has been that Marshall must have been biased since in
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almost all income tax cases he sided with the IRS and against taxpayers. 142
However, due to its limited litigation resources, the IRS generally seeks
Supreme Court review in only the most egregious abuse cases. As a result,
Marshall's record of deciding most cases for the IRS is hardly unique.
Supreme Court decisions in federal income tax go against taxpayers most of
the time, whoever writes the opinion.143
In fact, Marshall's writing on federal taxation reflects principled decision-
making, rather than systematic pro-IRS and antitaxpayer bias. In two of his
six opinions discussed in this essay, Marshall decided for taxpayers even
though they engaged in improper conduct. In Nassau Lens, the taxpayer
manipulated the mismatching of interest expense and interest income in or-
der to defer the taxation of business income for up to a decade. In Cottage
Savings, the taxpayer, albeit with a federal agency's encouragement,
grievously abused accounting principles to avoid disclosing realized losses.
Given the taxpayers' unsavory behavior, Marshall could easily have decided
against either or both. Instead, he rejected unprincipled arguments made by
the IRS in each case and found for the taxpayer.
The Supreme Court is often criticized for its failings in tax cases. 144 Mar-
shall demonstrated that it is possible for a Supreme Court Justice to write
intelligently and perceptively in the specialized and complex subject of fed-
eral taxation. His opinions are not only an important element of his record
as a Justice, but also one of the best arguments for the Supreme Court's
continued involvement in the law of federal income tax.
142. While on the Court, Marshall wrote 14 opinions for the Court on the substantive law of
federal income taxation. In 13 out of 14, he decided in favor of the IRS. See Cottage Savings Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991); United States v. Goodyear, 493 U.S. 132 (1989); Her-
nandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212
(1988); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987); United States v. American
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S.
834 (1986); United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972); United States v. Hilton,
397 U.S. 580 (1970); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Davis, 397
U.S. 301 (1970); United States v. Donruss, 393 U.S. 297 (1969); United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394
U.S. 678 (1969).
143. Dissent Without Opinion: The Behavior of Justice William 0. Douglas in Federal Tax Cases
contains the most comprehensive statistics on Supreme Court decisions on federal taxation: the
Court decided for the IRS over 75% of the time between 1939 and 1973. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET
AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FED-
ERAL TAX CASES 141-43 (1973).
144. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial
Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1099-1100 (1981) ("A Supreme Court opinion ought not to
become the basis for tax lawyers to make a laughingstock of the Court as they now do .... It is too
much, if not wrong, to expect the Court to develop an enduring and sophisticated tax
jurisprudence.").
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